by Hon. Chas. D. Grubbs, a member of the bar, under designation of the Chief Justice. At this term the appellants were given until the last day of the regular September, 1928, term of the Boyd circuit court, that being the next regular term of that court after the special June term, to file their bill of exceptions. At the September term, and within the time allowed by this order, the appellants tendered their bill of exceptions. The order recites that the bill was tendered, but the plaintiff, now appellee, objected to its filing, and that thereupon the court permitted said bill of exceptions to be tendered. This September term was presided over by the regular judge. He did not sign or order filed the bill of exceptions at this September term, and neither did he do so at the November term which was the next regular term of the Boyd circuit court after the September term. The next regular term of the Boyd circuit court after the November term began in January, 1929. The regular judge of the Boyd circuit court was ill, and thereupon Hon. Sam Hurst, the regular judge of the Twenty-Third judicial circuit, was, as provided by the Statutes, designated as special judge to hold this January term in the absence of the regular judge. At this January term Judge Hurst signed and approved the bill of exceptions which had been tendered at the preceding September term and ordered the same filed. The order recites that the bill had been tendered at the September term, and that time had been taken for the consideration of the bill. It is insisted first that the order of the court regarding this bill of exceptions entered at the September term does not recite that the court was going to take time to consider the bill, that without such an order the court was without power to take time, and that, in the absence of such an order, the bill of exceptions not having been filed within the time allowed by the order entered at the June term, it was too late for the court to order it filed at the January term. We are of opinion, however, that, where the party to a suit tenders his bill of exceptions within the time allowed him by law, he has done all that he is required to do, and that, if the court takes time in the consideration of the bill, the party tendering the bill is not prejudiced because the court in the order reciting that the bill was tendered fails to also incorporate the fact that he is going to take time to consider the tendered bill. In the case of Toner’s Adm’r v. South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co., 109 Ky. 41, *269