right through the application of RCW 59.18.360.” Br. of Resp’t at 22.
Princeton’s position is unpersuasive. Although the settlement agreement could potentially
waive Princeton’s obligation to notify the Allens to cure nonconformance of a general tenant duty
under RCW 59.18.190 (assuming all of the requirements of RCW 59.18.360 are met), none of the
Allens’ arguments implicate RCW 59.18.190 notices—they implicate issues and procedures more
concretely related to an eviction. Accordingly, RCW 59.18.360 and its exemptions have no
application.
Having concluded that the settlement agreement violates the antiwaiver provision, the
result is absolute—the agreement “is void and unenforceable.” RCW 59.18.230(1)(b). In such
cases, the remedy is typically to place the parties back to where they were before the agreement.
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 1 Wn.3d 545, 556, 528 P.3d 1269 (2023) (explaining that
“if the contract is rendered void ab initio” then the contract was never in force in the first place).
12
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 58183-3-II
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the superior court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.5
Princeton raises practical concerns with this result. Princeton argues that declaring the
settlement agreement void would place landlords in an “untenable position” every time they were
attempting to settle an unlawful detainer action. Br. of Resp’t at 32. Such an interpretation of the
statute, according to Princeton, will greatly reduce the use of settlement agreements, which would
not only harm landlords but also tenants, and waste judicial resources. Princeton claims landlords