Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 877933 Order and Opinion.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 877933 Order and Opinion.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/877933%20Order%20and%20Opinion.pdf ↗

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point to Danielson’s testimony that he was encouraged by leadership to speak

candidly at the board meeting. Again, all of this evidence is for the jury, not this

court, to weigh. Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d at 412-13 (holding that “to avoid summary

judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could

find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.”).

But the circumstantial evidence that Danielson was demoted after he accused the

hospital of racism in its budgeting decisions is substantial evidence supporting the

jury’s verdict. Gorman, 176 Wn. App. at 87.

To rebut the retaliation claim, the hospital points to Danielson’s testimony

that they were obligated to investigate allegations of Danielson’s misconduct. But

if the employer presents evidence of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

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the adverse employment action,” the plaintiff need only present evidence that

retaliation was a substantial factor. Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 446,

334 P.3d 541 (2014). Since an employer can be “motivated by multiple purposes,”

the employee does not need to disprove the “employer’s articulated reasons” to

meet the substantial factor burden. Id. at 447.

To show that retaliation could be a substantial factor, an employee may rely

on evidence that the employer knew of the employee’s protected action before the

employee was subjected to the adverse employment action. Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d

at 413. Danielson met his burden of production by testifying that within months of

the board meeting, the hospital deployed tools to “push [him] out.” This evidence

would allow the jury to infer that retaliation was a substantial factor, even if the