Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 877933 Order and Opinion.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 877933 Order and Opinion.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/877933%20Order%20and%20Opinion.pdf ↗

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environment as her supervisor’s comment that he would become an “angry man.”

175 Wn.2d at 276–77. We similarly hold that even though the racial slur occurred

outside the statute of limitations, it occurred within the same hostile work

environment as the racial discrimination that Danielson experienced until he

resigned.

The hospital argues in a Statement of Additional Authorities that, if we were

to allow Danielson to rely on the racial slur as evidence of a hostile work

environment, we would “abolish” the statute of limitations for such claims. But our

Supreme Court dismissed that argument in Antonius, when it rejected the

substantial relationship requirement “[i[n light of the rule of liberal construction and

the purposes of the law prohibiting . . . discrimination.” 153 Wn.2d at 270.

The hospital next claims that Crownover v. Dep’t of Transp., 165 Wn. App.

131, 143, 265 P.3d 971 (2011), supports its argument that Danielson fails to show

“similarly offensive language or conduct” in order to present evidence of the racial

slur to the jury. We disagree. In Crownover, this court affirmed summary judgment

dismissal because the plaintiff had sought to use unrelated “retaliatory conduct” to

anchor in gender discrimination that occurred before the statute of limitations. Id.

Danielson does not rely on retaliatory conduct to establish a hostile work

environment. He instead presented evidence that the employee who called

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Danielson a racial slur continued to be praised by the CEO, and that the same

CEO also treated Danielson differently because of his race.

The hospital also claims that Crownover supports its argument that an act

too remote in time, such as the racial slur in this case, cannot serve as evidence