Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick, 774 A.2d 847 (2001)

Citation: Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick, 774 A.2d 847 (2001)
Parent Document: Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick, 774 A.2d 847 (2001)
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island (state)
Effective Date: 2001-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1515698/kingstown-mobile-home-park-v-st... ↗

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Third, conspicuously absent from § 31-44-2(a) is any language or other indication that the enumerated “limitations” set forth therein were intended to constitute the exclusive or only bases for terminating a mobile-home-park tenancy. Compare, e.g., Fla.Stat .Ann. § 723.061(1) (West 2001) (“A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section.”). It is one thing for the General Assembly to specify that such provisions take precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance, but it is quite another for the Legislature to require that the “limitations” constitute the exclusive grounds for terminating a mobile-home-park tenancy. Here, the General Assembly provided for the former but not for the latter. Because the General Assembly has included no language in the statute evincing an intention to change or to override the otherwise applicable common and statutory law of this state allowing termination of residential tenan*863cies on other lawful grounds, I do not believe we should construe § 31-44-2(a) to do so. Indeed, the statute in question (§ 31-44-2(a)) fails to include any language from which one could even infer an exclusivity provision, much less does it clearly and unambiguously so provide by its express terms.

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