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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 796925.pdf

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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 796925.pdf
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Washington (state)
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cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or
2. Any mental, developmental, traumatic, or psychological disorder, including but
not limited to cognitive limitation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.
SMC 14.04.030(B).

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 79692-5-I/19

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct, [an employee] must

show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) [the employer] took

some adverse employment action against her, and (3) retaliation was a

substantial factor behind the adverse employment action.”15 Wash. v. Boeing

Co., 105 Wn. App. 1, 14, 19 P.3d 1041 (2000) (citing Delahunty v. Cahoon, 66

Wn. App. 829, 840-41, 832 P.2d 1378 (1992)). A “substantial factor” must be a

significant motivating factor, but need not be the sole factor, or even a

determining factor, in the decision. Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 444.

Herein, AHS first asserts that the City failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. This is so, AHS asserts, because there is no dispute that (1)

Pope was unable, due to her disability, to perform the essential functions of her

job because she could not use the telephone clock in system utilized by AHS,

and (2) Pope never requested a reasonable accommodation because she failed

to provide medical proof of her disability. We disagree.

AHS’s assertion that Pope was unable to perform essential functions of

her job presumes that properly utilizing the phone clock in system was an

essential function of the job.16 But the record shows that the City presented