Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Citation
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Parent Document
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Jurisdiction
- Maine (state)
- Effective Date
- 1897-08-16
Other Sections in This Document (14)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
- Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (1897)
Full Text
730 charsSaid Shaw, C. J., in Howard v. Merriam, supra: “ It is an intrinsic quality in an estate at will, that it is personal and can not pass to an assignee; and that by an alienation in fee, or for years, the estate at will is, ipso facto, determined and can not subsist longer. This is a limitation of the estate, which is incident to its very nature; when therefore it is thus determined by operation of law, it is determined by its own limitation without notice.” It is, therefore, an incident to any tenancy at will that it is limited to such time as the lessor shall own the estate, as it is also limited to the lifetime of the parties. Ferrin v. Kenney, 10 Met. 294; Baker v. Smith, 21 Maine, 414; Burdin v. Ordway, 88 Maine, 375.