under a will but for its transfer to someone else. A beneficiary’s interest under a will is not usually
designated as a “share,” in contrast to a surviving spouse’s claims under the statute, which are.
Additionally, § 321 is part of the chapter addressing “Descent and Survivors’ Rights,” including
intestate and elective shares; it is not found in the chapter addressing wills.
¶ 20. We find it apparent that § 321, like its predecessor concerning real estate
conveyances, straddles the competing goals that our law has recognized. It promotes the free
alienation of property, and it also serves to protect a surviving spouse. Our law has long required
that a spouse will receive a minimum share of a decedent’s estate, and § 321 assures that the
minimum protection required by the elective or intestate share is not defeated. See Budde v.
Pierce, 135 Vt. 152, 155, 375 A.2d 984, 986 (1977) (“It is a well established rule of law in Vermont
that the statutory rights of a surviving spouse are predicated upon sound policy considerations and
are to be afforded great weight and deference.”). The law is not designed to ensure that a spouse’s
expectations are satisfied.
¶ 21. We note that to the extent that wife is claiming some type of contractual right to the
IRA funds by virtue of having once been designated a beneficiary, that claim fails. See Luszcz v.
Lavoie, 787 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc) (stating that until IRA owner’s
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death, “beneficiary merely has an expectancy in the IRA because until the owner’s death, the
owner can do with the IRA as desired, including changing the beneficiary designation or cashing
out the account altogether”). Additionally, wife offers no persuasive support for her assertion that