husband, so far as respect the widow, must be regarded, at the time of this death, as being the
owner and having seizin of the property in question.” Id. at 123.
¶ 15. In Dunnett, 97 Vt. at 427, 123 A. at 630-31, the Court again discussed the nature of
a wife’s right to property that her husband possessed or might acquire during coverture. It
reiterated that the wife’s interest “during coverture in the husband’s property is not a vested
interest.” Id. at 427, 123 A. at 630. Instead, “the wife, during the life of the husband, has such an
interest in his property as the law recognizes and protects”; it “is not a present estate in his property,
but it gives her an equitable right of action to protect her against any conveyance thereof, made by
him with the fraudulent intent to deprive her of such rights therein, as, by statute, would accrue to
her at his decease.” Id. The Court also discussed the high threshold for establishing fraudulent
intent as referenced above. See id. at 428, 123 A. at 631 (“If the rule were that a fraudulent intent
to deprive a wife of her marital rights is necessarily presumed from knowledge of the effect of the
conveyance by the husband of his property, his sole deed during coverture would be as a rope of
sand.”).
¶ 16. By 2008, the law continued to provide surviving spouses the right to elect against
a will and claim their statutory share of the decedent’s personal estate and real estate. See 14
V.S.A. §§ 401, 402, 461, 465, 474 (2008), repealed by 2009, No. 55, § 4. The prohibition against
fraudulent real estate transfers was also codified at 14 V.S.A. § 473 (2008), which stated: