¶ 8. On appeal, wife challenges each of the grounds offered by the court in support of
its summary judgment decision. We find it necessary to address only wife’s challenge to the
meaning of the term “share” in § 321. Wife argues that this term is not limited to a spouse’s
elective or intestate share. She maintains that a surviving spouse might have a claim to a share of
an asset that “would have been distributed pursuant to the will, if not for the voided transfer, and
the surviving spouse was a beneficiary under the will.” Wife suggests that a spouse might also
have a claim to an asset if he or she had been a named beneficiary of an asset and the designation
was then changed. Even if the statute does refer to an intestate or elective share, wife argues that
her share of the IRA should be determined under intestacy law because the IRA was a “part of a
decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will.” 14 V.S.A. § 301(a) (“Any part of a
decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the
decedent’s heirs, except as modified by the decedent’s will.”).
4
¶ 9. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” State
v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, ¶ 9, 191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129. In interpreting 14 V.S.A. § 321, “[o]ur
goal . . . is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Dep’t of Taxes v. Montani, 2018 VT 21,
¶ 24, __ Vt. __, 184 A.3d 723 (quotation omitted). “In looking at any particular statutory scheme,
we look to the whole and every part of it, its subject matter, and its effect and consequences in
determining intent.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If the language [of the statute] is clear, we apply