State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- Citation
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- Parent Document
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2024-11-05
Other Sections in This Document (26)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
- State v. Sinchak, 229 Conn. App. 38 (2024)
Full Text
1,210 charsIf a party’s interest in finality were a relevant factor,
the ‘‘well established’’ rule that an order granting a
motion to open is not a final judgment would not exist.
Curcio requires much more, in particular, that the
appellant show that a recognized right will be ‘‘ ‘irre-
trievably lost’ ’’ and that it will be ‘‘ ‘irreparably harmed’ ’’
if it cannot take an immediate appeal. Id. The state’s
interest in finality is not the type of recognized right
that the second prong of Curcio is intended to protect.
To the contrary, the state’s interest in seeking reversal
of the court’s order before a new sentencing hearing
is no different from that of any party that would prefer
to appeal from an interlocutory order rather than be
subject to additional proceedings necessitated by that
order. Furthermore, no interest of the state will be
irretrievably lost or irreparably harmed because it will
have a full opportunity to challenge on appeal the
court’s decision granting the motion to correct if it is
aggrieved by the defendant’s resentencing.7