imposition of sentence, argues ‘‘that the granting of a
motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal man-
ner, which upsets a prior final judgment, is a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal and that the state, victims,
and/or their survivors should not be required [to] litigate
a new sentencing proceeding many years after the fact
before the state may appeal the granting of the motion.’’
In support of this argument, the state relies on our
Supreme Court’s decision in Solomon v. Keiser, 212
Conn. 741, 562 A.2d 524 (1989), in which the court
recognized a limited exception to the ‘‘well established
[rule] that an order opening a judgment ordinarily is
not a final judgment within § 52-263.’’ Id., 746. That
exception is ‘‘where the appeal challenges the power
of the court to act to set aside the judgment.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 747. Our Supreme Court
has further explained that this narrow exception applies
only when there is a colorable claim that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to act altogether, as opposed to a
claim that the court abused its discretion in acting
within its established jurisdiction. See Wolfork v. Yale
Medical Group, 335 Conn. 448, 463–65, 239 A.3d 272
(2020) (distinguishing immediately appealable color-
able claim that trial court lacked jurisdiction from claim
of incorrect decision made in course of exercising its
jurisdiction).
In the present case, the state does not argue that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence. In fact, as the
state acknowledges, Practice Book § 43-22 expressly
authorizes the trial court to entertain such motions ‘‘at
any time.’’ The state simply disagrees with the court’s
conclusion that the defendant’s sentence was illegal
and does not make any colorable claim that the court
did not have jurisdiction to grant the defendant’s
motion. For this reason, the state’s reliance on Solomon
and its progeny is misplaced.
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