. . . .” Id. We held that the amendment “violate[d] the
separation of powers provision because it significantly
interfere[d] with the orderly functioning of the Superior
Court’s judicial role. The nature of this conclusion relies
on the premise that P.A. 00-200, § 5, [would] create an
interference with the trial court’s disposition of cases
other than just this case. . . . It is these many [poten-
tial] cases together, along with the elimination of the
Superior Court’s discretion to grant bail in appropriate
circumstances in that large class of cases, that [create]
the significant interference.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id., 509–10.
In the present case, during the commission’s admin-
istrative proceedings, the referee asserted an expansive
view of the commission’s ongoing jurisdiction over the
Judicial Branch, concluding—without citation to any
legal authority—that the Judicial Branch would be “free
to discriminate against attorneys” and “its own employ-
ees” unless the commission exercises jurisdiction over it.
The referee assumed that the commission had a continu-
ing duty to police the Judicial Branch’s regulation of
the practice of law, similarly declaring, without citing
to any authority, that “[v]ictims of alleged discrimina-
tion cannot be limited to having the alleged perpetrator
determine whether . . . discrimination occurred,” and
thus purportedly disqualifying the entire Judicial Branch
from adjudicating claims of discrimination within its
attorney discipline proceedings. Regardless of whether
the commission ultimately acts on this theory in any
particular attorney disciplinary proceeding, the specter
of the commission’s administrative litigation would chill
or deter the Judicial Branch’s impartial regulation of
attorneys, who are “officers of the court appointed to
assist the court in the administration of justice . . . .”
Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. 186. Standing com-
mittee members must not alter their disciplinary deci-
sions—or, as specifically challenged here, their routine
decisions to schedule hearings and to file motions—based
on whether the commission would approve. The commis-
sion’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction in cases like this
one violates the separation of powers doctrine because
State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings