government in article second of the constitution of Con-
necticut, as amended by article eighteen of the amend-
ments: “The powers of government shall be divided into
three distinct departments, and each of them confided to
a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative,
to one; those which are executive, to another; and those
which are judicial, to another.” Conn. Const., amend.
XVIII. “[T]he primary purpose of this constitutional
doctrine is to prevent commingling of different powers of
government in the same hands. . . . The [state] constitu-
tion achieves this purpose by prescribing limitations and
duties for each branch that are essential to each branch’s
independence and performance of assigned powers.”
(Citation omitted.) Massameno v. Statewide Grievance
Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 551–52, 663 A.2d 317 (1995).
“It is axiomatic that no branch of government organized
under a constitution may exercise any power that is not
explicitly bestowed by that constitution or that is not
essential to the exercise thereof.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 552, quoting Kinsella v. Jaekle,
192 Conn. 704, 723, 475 A.2d 243 (1984).
“The separation of powers doctrine serves a dual func-
tion: it limits the exercise of power within each branch,
yet ensures the independent exercise of that power. Nev-
ertheless, it cannot be rigidly applied always to render
mutually exclusive the roles of each branch of govern-
ment. As we have recognized, ‘the great functions of
government are not divided in any such way that all
acts of the nature of the function of one department can
never be exercised by another department; such a divi-
sion is impracticable, and if carried out would result in
the paralysis of government. Executive, legislative and
judicial powers . . . of necessity overlap each other, and
cover many acts [that] are in their nature common to
more than one department.’ ” Massameno v. Statewide
Grievance Committee, supra, 234 Conn. 552, quoting
In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 38, 31 A. 522
it would be imprudent to affirm the trial court’s judgment on alterna-
tive, nonconstitutional grounds without first determining whether its
constitutional holding was correct as a matter of law.
State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings