sanction of the judges of the Superior Court.” Heiberger
v. Clark, supra, 186.
The Judicial Branch has established that the commis-
sion’s administrative action in the present case interferes
with the orderly conduct of the essential functions of
the Judicial Branch. Subjecting the Judicial Branch
to administrative proceedings to review the exercise of
its authority over the practice of law would likely have
a chilling effect on the actions of the standing commit-
tees in the course of their work. This direct review by
an executive branch agency—outside of the established
appellate procedures already available to parties within
the Judicial Branch—carries with it the potential to
chill or deter the exercise of judicial power through the
burden of administrative litigation. As we have said in
upholding the application of judicial immunity, if the
threat of litigation were to hang over judicial decisions,
“[t]he resulting timidity would be hard to detect or con-
trol, and it would manifestly detract from independent
and impartial adjudication.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families,
supra, 352 Conn. 749.
It is the interference with the orderly conduct of the
Judicial Branch’s essential functions not only in this
case, but also in potential future cases, that gives rise
to the separation of powers violation. See, e.g., State
v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492, 509–10, 811 A.2d 667
(2002) (“[W]e consider the separation of powers chal-
lenge to have merit . . . . It is these many [potential] cases
together . . . that [create] the significant interference
[with the orderly functioning of the Superior Court’s
judicial role].”). In McCahill, we considered whether
No. 00-200, § 5, of the 2000 Public Acts (P.A. 00-200)
violated the separation of powers doctrine insofar as it
“restrict[ed] a trial court from releasing any individual
who has been convicted of a crime involving physical force
that is actual, attempted or threatened.” Id., 506. The
statutory amendment “mandate[d] immediate incarcera-
tion upon the [return] of a guilty verdict” and applied to
“even those defendants who have not yet been sentenced
State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings