Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635 (2013)

Citation
Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635 (2013)
Parent Document
Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635 (2013)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2013-06-25

Other Sections in This Document (19)

Full Text

1,127 chars
Furthermore, we note that the “statutes relating to [s]ummary [p]rocess” referenced in the waiver provision at issue allow for the waiver of a notice to quit in only one circumstance—where the operative lease terminates for lapse of time. See General Statutes § 47a-25. Reading a “lessee’s default” contextual requirement into the waiver provision would effectively read the provision out of the lease, as it would be unenforceable under the summary process statutes. See General Statutes § 47a-4 (b). A reading which renders the waiver provision superfluous does not comport with our precedent requiring us to construe a lease “in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 284 Conn. 8; see also United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 674, 791 A.2d 546 (2002) (“[t]he law of contract interpretation militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous”).6 The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.