Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635 (2013)

Although Connors v. Clark, 79 Conn. 100, 63 A. 951 (1906), predated the enactment of § 47a-25, our Supreme Court’s inteipretation of a similarly positioned waiver provision is illuminating. In Connors, the complaint in a summary process action alleged that a written lease terminated by lapse of time; id., 102; but did not “allege the giving of a notice to quit as provided by statute.” Id., 103. The lessees contended that “without such notice the summary process could not be successfully maintained.” Id., 103. The court referenced the parties’ written lease, which provided that “all right of notice to quit possession is expressly waived by . . . lessees.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court noted that the provision was “found in a paragraph which deals solely with terminations from other causes than lapse of time, and stipulates for such terminations, and it is connected with the body of that paragraph by the conjunction ‘and.’ ” Id. The court, however, concluded: “Notwithstanding the argument drawn from this fact, we think that it is apparent that the intention of the parties was that the waiver provision in question should be as comprehensive as its language naturally implies, and include ‘all’ right of notice, and not a right of notice under certain conditions created by the paragraph in which it chances to appear.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Likewise, here, the last sentence of paragraph 17 explicitly states that the lessee waives “all right to any notice to quit” as prescribed by the summary process statutes. Reading this provision “as comprehen*643sive[ly] as its language naturally implies”; id.; we cannot conclude that the waiver in question pertains only to the lessee’s default context.