Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn. App. 635 (2013)

Here, as both parties recognize, the heading and initial sentences of paragraph 17 of the lease relate to circumstances in which the lessee defaults on its obligations under the lease. That fact alone is not dispositive, however, because paragraph 17 is also the only paragraph of the lease to mention summary process actions and the statutory requirements pertaining to such actions. The relevant waiver language appears at the end of the paragraph, after the references to the lessee’s default and the initial mention of the summary process statutes, and states that the lessee “FURTHER WAIVES all right to any notice to quit possession as may be prescribed by the statutes relating to [sjummary [process.” (Emphasis added.) Reading paragraph 17 in the context of the lease as a whole, as we must, we conclude that the relevant waiver language is not limited to the default context and instead provides that the defendant waived all rights to any notice to quit as allowed by the statutes in any summary process action.5 See Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., supra, *642284 Conn. 8 (“the lease must be construed as a whole” [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 987 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (court unwilling to resolve contract interpretation question based on section headings “where doing so would conflict with the plain reading of operative language elsewhere in the contract”).