guilt of the offense charged, supports the claimed purpose of
the MOU.
The alleged potential for Police Department prosecutors’
conflict of interest set forth above, whether or not framed as an
overstepping of authority, violates the accused’s federal and
state constitutional rights to procedural due process because
the potential conflict undermines ‘‘the reliability of the adver-
sary process through which criminal justice is . . . dispensed.’’
(Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d at 25-26.) The
potential conflict raises a claim that the Police Department
prosecutors are not ‘‘exercising pretrial prosecutorial discretion
in an evenhanded manner, based on the merits of the case or
other legitimate prosecutorial concerns.’’ (People v Adams, 20
NY3d at 613.) The relief petitioners seek is ‘‘to preserve our
means of criminal adjudication from the inevitably corrosive
MATTER OF JEFFRYES v VANCE [58 Misc 3d 185] 193
effects and unjust consequences of an unfair adversary pro-
cess.’’ (Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d at 26; see
People v Adams, 20 NY3d at 612-613.) Petitioners emphasize
that they do not seek to prohibit respondent District Attorney
from pursuing his duties and exercising all the powers of his
office, as demonstrated by petitioners’ motion only to disqualify
the Police Department prosecutors in the criminal actions, not
to dismiss those actions based on the prosecutors’ identity.
(Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d at 54; Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d
at 12.)
Nevertheless, it surely is unfair if the prosecutors are
concerned about protecting their employer and co-employees
from civil liability, rather than being solely concerned about
achieving justice for the people of the county, who elected the