stances, even if this court determines the issues in petitioners’
favor, such a determination will supply neither a basis to
prevent the prosecutions from proceeding, as they will have
ended, nor a basis to attack any conviction collaterally, as none
will have occurred. (Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15
NY3d at 24; Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v Gould, 14 NY3d
at 634 n 9.)
III. Petitioners’ Claims upon Which the Relief Sought is Based
At minimum, petitioners’ allegations state a claim for a viola-
tion of lawful procedure (CPLR 7803 [3]), if not for a prosecu-
tion in excess of the lawful authority of the quasi-judicial body,
the District Attorney, both by the body exercising that exces-
sive authority, respondent Police Department, and by the body
delegating that excessive authority, respondent District At-
torney. (CPLR 7803 [2]; Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d at
147; Steingut v Gold, 42 NY2d at 315-316; Dondi v Jones, 40
NY2d at 13, 15; see Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d at 51, 54.)
Petitioners’ allegations show that respondent District Attorney
allows respondent Police Department attorneys complete
authority to determine whether, whom, and how to prosecute
all charges brought in the Summons Part, without any supervi-
sion by the District Attorney, the only public officer elected to
exercise those prosecutorial powers. (Schumer v Holtzman, 60
NY2d at 52; Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d at 15.) Because respon-
dent Police Department issues the summonses through which
violations are charged, rather than through an accusatory
instrument that would not be brought in the Summons Part,
the Police Department itself determines which violations it will
prosecute and which ones will not be prosecuted at all, without
respondent District Attorney’s input.