Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 389189_pub.pdf

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applicable statute, nor is it based on Supreme Court precedent. It is not binding on us.

See In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold, 190 Wn.2d 136, 154, 410 P.3d 1133 (2018). The

wording of the applicable statute indicates a tenant is entitled to a trial so long as they

raise a “genuine issue” of “material fact.” RCW 59.18.380. This is nearly the identical

language that governs summary judgment. See CR 56(c). We review summary judgment

orders de novo. Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 404, 410, 295 P.3d 201 (2013).

Thus, it appears something close to de novo review should apply, at least when a tenant

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No. 38918-9-III
Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

denies the landlord’s grounds for eviction or raises an affirmative defense. 5

Ms. Daniels disputes that her conduct substantially or repeatedly and unreasonably

interfered with K&H’s use and enjoyment of the premises. She makes two arguments.

We address each in turn.

First, Ms. Daniels notes that the RLTA defines “premises” as property “held

out for the use of tenants.” RCW 59.18.030(22). Thus, she argues that in order for a

tenant’s conduct to interfere with a landlord’s “use and enjoyment of the premises,”

the landlord must also be a tenant. RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) (emphasis added). We disagree.

Ms. Daniels’s proposed reading of the statute strains its text. See White v. Salvation Army,

118 Wn. App. 272, 279, 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (statutes are construed to avoid absurd

results). Just because a landlord holds out their premises for the use of others does not

mean the landlord abandons their own right or ability to enjoy their property. See Rental