Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Citation
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Jurisdiction
- Washington (state)
- Source verification
- official_capture_completeness_unverified
- Original Source
- https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/893900.pdf ↗
Related Parts of This Source
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
- Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
Full Text
1,710 charsconstitution does not guarantee the right to access bail via a sufficient surety. Subsection (b)(4) was therefore modeled after a federal scheme that may not have appreciated Washington's unique constitutional framework. Nonetheless, it is possible to read CrR 3 .2(b) consistent with our surety guaranty. Even though CrR 3 .2(b)(4) does not satisfy article I, section 20 on its own, the rule as a whole requires the court to impose the least restrictive alternative that reasonably assures the accused's appearance. As noted, CrR 3 .2(b)( 5) allows a court to "[r]equire the execution of a bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof." This provision safeguards a defendant's right to a surety bond as an alternative to putting up cash or collateral, thus providing an option that will often be less restrictive than the scenario contemplated in CrR 3.2(b)(4). A court setting bail is obligated to allow the option listed under CrR 3.2(b)(5) unless it finds such a surety arrangement will not adequately secure the defendant's appearance. Other than general discussion about whether the current state of the commercial bail bonding system adequately ensures appearance, this record contains no particularized findings about Barton's likelihood of appearance. To the extent that the trial court's October 18, 2012 order excluded a surety bond under CrR 3.2(b)(5) from the list of options available to Barton, it was more restrictive than CrR 3.2(b) as a whole allows and contrary to article I, section 20. We hold that the October 18, 2012 order entered in this case improperly prohibited Barton's access to a surety as guaranteed by article I, section 20.