Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 893900.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
Source verification: official_capture_completeness_unverified
Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/893900.pdf ↗

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Admittedly, it is challenging to sort through the cases relied on by Barton and

the State because many involve slightly different questions than are presented here.

For example, Barton cites several cases that reject cash-only bail but do not

specifically address whether allowing for "cash or other security" would satisfy their

state constitutions' bail provisions. See, e.g., Two Jinn, Inc. v. District Court, 150

Idaho 647, 249 P.3d 840, 847 (2011) (explaining that "the Idaho Constitution

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State v. Barton (Peter Richard), 89390-0

prevents cash-only bail" under its sufficient sureties clause); State v. Hance, 2006

VT 97, 180 Vt. 357, 910 A.2d 874, 876 (holding that an all-cash bail violates

Vermont's sufficient sureties clause); Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St. 3d 309, 2005-0hio-

5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, 18 (2005) (holding an all-cash bail violated Ohio's sufficient

sureties clause); Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that an all-cash bail violates

Minnesota's sufficient sureties clause); Golden, 546 So. 2d at 502-03 (holding all-

cash bail violates Louisiana's sufficient sureties clause). Nonetheless, the discussion

in these cases is helpful to Barton to the extent there is a clear contrast between cash

deposited with the court and a third-party surety arrangement. At a minimum, they

support the notion that a defendant must be allowed the option of accessing a third

party surety-regardless of whether it is a commercial surety.

As for some of the cases relied on by the State, they seem to hold that a

defendant is not entitled to use a commercial bail bondsman. See Gendron, 217

N.E.2d at 805; Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1032-33; State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208,215