PHOEBE FLEMMING v. GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P., 177 N.E.3d 1244 (2021)

Citation: PHOEBE FLEMMING v. GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P., 177 N.E.3d 1244 (2021)
Parent Document: PHOEBE FLEMMING v. GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P., 177 N.E.3d 1244 (2021)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2021-10-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10271968/phoebe-flemming-v-greystar-man... ↗

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[Note 1] Although neither party has raised the issue, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 99-100 (2011). The motion judge allowed Flemming's motion for partial summary judgment in part and denied Greystar's cross motion for summary judgment, and a judgment awarding Flemming damages, attorney's fees, and costs entered on April 26, 2019. Both parties filed notices of appeal from the April 26, 2019, judgment; that judgment was not appealable, however, because it was not designated as separate and final under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974). Subsequently, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing Flemming's remaining individual claims with prejudice and an "assented-to order for separate and final judgment as to [Flemming's] individual claims." A second judge endorsed the assented-to order, and on August 21, 2020, a rule 54 (b) judgment entered "dismissing [Flemming's] individual claims with prejudice pursuant to" the assented-to order. Greystar filed a second notice of appeal on September 21, 2020. We conclude that this second notice of appeal brings the merits properly before us. While the rule 54 (b) judgment refers only to the claims dismissed by stipulation, it is clear from the assented-to order that the parties' intent was for separate and final judgment to enter on all the individual claims, including those resolved on summary judgment, while the class claims were stayed pending resolution of this appeal. In addition, the second judge was within his discretion in finding no just reason for delay. See Finnegan v. Baker, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 39 (2015). In light of the procedural history, and that the parties have fully briefed the merits, the interests of judicial economy would not be served by remanding for entry of a new rule 54 (b) judgment. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra.

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