Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252 (2002)

Citation: Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252 (2002)
Parent Document: Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252 (2002)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2002-06-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6578538/berish-v-bornstein/ ↗

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Under the Massachusetts practice of notice pleading, “there is no requirement that a complaint state the correct substantive theory of the case.” Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 709 (1981). See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Ahern v. Warner, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 226 n.2 (1983). A complaint must, however, contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974), which affords fair notice to the defendant of the basis and nature of the action against him. Clark v. Greenhalge, 411 Mass. 410, 413 n.6 (1991); Ciccone v. Smith, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 734 (1975). Here, the breach of fiduciary duty claim sets forth allegations against “Bomstein,” whereas other counts in the complaint identify “Bomstein, individually and as Trustee of the [nominee trust].” Applying our own view of the law, Lucey v. Hero Int’l Corp., supra, we conclude that the complaint did not afford fair notice that the trustees were asserting this claim against Bomstein in his capacity as trustee of the nominee trust. Indeed, any fiduciary duties that Bomstein owed to the unit owners’ association, were owed in his capacity as trustee of that assocation and not as trustee of the nominee trust.29 We therefore conclude that the master properly narrowed this claim as against Bomstein as trustee of the unit owners’ association.

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