RCW 59.18.280 bars a landlord from asserting any claim to the tenant's deposit. The
exception requires "the landlord [to show] that circumstances beyond [its] control
prevented [it] from providing the statement within the fourteen days." RCW 59.18.280.
We see no ambiguity in the statutory exception, and therefore give effect to its plain
meaning: Circumstances are either beyond a landlord's control or within a landlord's
control. Circumstances within a landlord's control can be divided into either active
delays or passive delays. For purposes of this analysis, "active delays" are when the
landlord simply fails to promptly do something, and "passive delays" are when the
landlord permits an unreasonable delay by another. We hold that a landlord may not avail
itself ofRCW 59.18.280's exception unless it accounts for any active or passive delay
sufficient to show that it made a conscientious attempt to comply with the statutory 14
day notice.
Here, Madison has not shown this. First, Madison failed to explain why it did not
provide DavisPro a work order soon after the Goodeills vacated on August 27, 2013, and
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
gave it a key the following day. Madison did not provide DavisPro a work order until
September 9-12 days after it had access to the vacant rental. Within two days, DavisPro
cleaned and repaired the inside and outside of the rental so it was rentable. Had Madison
promptly contacted DavisPro, DavisPro would have completed its work well within the
statutory 14 day timeframe. Second, Madison did not explain why it could not have
learned of DavisPro's actual charges weeks before October 1. Madison could have