Section 1950
- Citation
- Section 1950
- Parent Document
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1995-03-06
Other Sections in This Document (169)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
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Full Text
1,783 charsFinally, plaintiffs contend that to allow setoff would be inappropriate in class actions such as this because of numerous practical difficulties. They stress that (1) the class is comprised of approximately 10,000 individuals, many of whom may have moved to other parts of the state or country, (2) defendants have raised between 6,200 and 8,000 claims for setoff, which must be litigated individually, (3) because the security deposits in question are between $100 and $150, a relatively small amount of money, many class members may not appear to oppose defendants’ claims, and (4) if the class members do not appear, defendants will prevail by default on their claims for setoff, and may be unjustly enriched. Given these difficulties, plaintiffs ask us not only to bar defendants from raising setoff, but to reconsider our many earlier decisions holding setoff may be raised when the claims are not liquidated (see, e.g., Erlich v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 551, 555 [47 Cal.Rptr. 473, 407 P.2d 649]; Hauger v. Gates, supra, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755), at least in the context of class actions. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, it may well be possible on remand to shape a remedy that will avoid many of the problems plaintiffs have identified. Second, it is inappropriate to deprive defendants of their substantive rights merely because those rights are inconvenient in light of the litigation posture plaintiffs have chosen. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 462 [115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701, 76 A.L.R.3d 1223], fn. omitted [“Class actions are provided only as a means to enforce substantive law. Altering the substantive law to accommodate procedure would be to confuse the means with the ends—to sacrifice the goal for the going.”].)