Section 1950
- Citation
- Section 1950
- Parent Document
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1995-03-06
Other Sections in This Document (169)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
- Granberry v. Islay Investments, 889 P.2d 970 (1995)
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Full Text
1,193 charsSecond, plaintiffs contend that to allow defendants to raise setoff would violate the equitable principle that an individual may not change his position to the detriment of another. (See § 3512.) They note defendants originally claimed (1) the excess payments were rent, (2) they had never demanded or received security deposits from plaintiffs, and (3) they, not plaintiffs, were to *749bear the cost of unpaid rent, repairs, and cleaning. Only after the excess payments were found to be security deposits did defendants claim they were entitled to a setoff. Plaintiffs argue this change of position worked to their detriment because they did not receive adequate notice of defendants’ claims. However, the original class notice contained the following paragraph: “Defendants contend that any refund you might be entitled to recover must be reduced by the amount of any unpaid rent, costs reasonably necessary to clean and repair damage you caused to the apartment, in excess of ordinary wear and tear, and that such sum could exceed the amount of any refund or damages you might receive.” In light of this notice, plaintiffs’ contentions regarding estoppel and lack of notice are unavailing.