Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)

Citation: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Parent Document: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2020-09-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4784084/aljabban-v-fontana-indoor-swap-... ↗

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      “A court has inherent power to exercise reasonable control over all
proceedings connected with the litigation before it . . . and maintain ‘the
dignity and authority of the court’ . . . , and to summarily punish for acts
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court when they
impede, embarrass or obstruct it in the discharge of its duties.” (Mowrer v.
Superior Court (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 230, citations omitted; see also Code
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a) [“Every court shall have the power to do . . . (1) To
preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence” and “(3) To provide for
the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers”].) Thus, in this
case, if plaintiffs’ counsel had made a request for the trial court to intervene,
we would expect the trial court to have assessed the situation and to have
taken reasonable steps to preserve a respectful courtroom atmosphere
conducive to a fair trial. However, because plaintiffs’ counsel made no
specific request of the trial court to exercise such control and did not give the
trial court any occasion to state on the record whether it perceived any
objectionable behavior by Shapiro, we do not consider Aljabban’s appellate
contention that he was denied a fair trial due to the trial court’s lack of
response to Shapiro’s alleged misbehavior.
F.    The Attorney Fee and Costs Award
      The attorney fee provision in the vendor’s permit states, “In the event it
becomes necessary to institute legal proceedings to enforce the terms of this
License, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of Attorney’s fees
and court costs.” As defendants were the prevailing parties on all causes of
action, the trial court relied on the attorney fee provision in the vendor’s
permit to order that Aljabban and Carrasco pay attorney fees to defendants

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