Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)

Citation: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Parent Document: Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2020-09-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4784084/aljabban-v-fontana-indoor-swap-... ↗

Full Text

2,210 chars

Turning to the parties’ agreement, paragraph 4 states, “Booth
construction (i.e. walls, flooring, and security gates) becomes a permanent
fixture with the Swap Meet and may not be removed or demolished by
Vendor upon termination of the license.” The question presented is whether
                                        21
the Items fall under the scope of this provision because they constitute booth
construction and are thus permanent fixtures that may not be removed by
the vendor upon termination of the license.
       Aljabban contends that the Items were not permanent fixtures within
the meaning of this provision because paragraph 4 specifically identifies only
three items of booth construction—namely “walls, flooring, and security
gates.” Because this specific list does not encompass a sink/cabinet unit, a
water heater or decorative molding, Aljabban argues that the parties did not
agree that the Items were permanent fixtures that could not be removed. As
Aljabban contends, the language “is very specific and exclusive” in that “[i]t
defines ‘permanent fixture’ and itemizes it was the language ‘i.e.’ meaning
‘that is.’ ”
       We understand Aljabban’s argument, and we recognize that the use of
the signal “i.e.” creates some confusion. The signal “i.e.” means “That is,”
(I.E., Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)), and thus normally indicates a
clarification of a preceding term, not an example. To communicate that
“walls, flooring, and security gates” were meant as nonexclusive examples of
booth construction, paragraph 4 could have used the signal “e.g.,” which
means “For example.” (E.G., Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).)
Nevertheless, as we will explain, it appears to us that the contract may
merely have used an inexact signal before the words “walls, flooring, and
security gates” by choosing the term “i.e.,” and that it did not intend to
provide an exhaustive and exclusive list of all of the things that could
constitute a permanent fixture.
       Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law, subject
to independent review on appeal, and we may refer to extrinsic evidence to
determine whether a contract is ambiguous. (Winet v. Price (1992) 4

Other Sections in This Document (85)

Full Text