Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 318583.pub.pdf

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229,90 S. Ct. 400, 24 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1969) provides one example of Jimenez's

misapplication of § 1981. Sullivan arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a codification of other

protections included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The United States Supreme Court

has "long construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly." CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 447, 446 (relying

on Sullivan as presenting a "comparable question" because "similar to § 1981 except that

it focused ... [upon] rights related to the ownership of property"). Sullivan, the plaintiff,

leased a home that he owned in Fairfax County, Virginia, to a Black family and at the

same time attempted to assign to them his membership share in Little Hunting Park, Inc.,

a corporation that owned and operated a community park and playground facilities for the

benefit of county residents. A membership share entitled members of a shareholder's

family to use the recreation facilities. Under the corporation's bylaws, a person owning a

membership share was entitled when renting his home to assign the share to his tenant,

"subject to approval of the board of directors." Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234.

The Little Hunting Park board refused to approve Sullivan's attempted assignment

to his tenant, and, when he protested, expelled him, tendering him cash for his shares.

The refusal to approve the assignment was within the board's power under the

corporation's bylaws and the expulsion was likewise "backed by [the] state court

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No. 3 1858-3-III
Sambas ivan v. Kadlec Med. Ctr.
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judgment." Id. at 237. Yet whatever validity the board's two actions had under the

bylaws, its refusal to approve the assignment of the membership share was "clearly an