Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)

Citation: Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)
Parent Document: Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2012-11-19
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5811531/oviedo-v-windsor-twelve-properties-llc/ ↗

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As we described above, “section 425.16 addresses itself to causes of action that arise from acts taken in furtherance of a defendant’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff’s cause of action does not necessarily arise from a defendant’s section 425.16 protected activity merely because the plaintiff’s suit was filed after the defendant engaged in that activity. [Citation.] ‘The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be read to mean that “any claim asserted in an action which arguably was filed in retaliation for the exercise of speech or petition rights falls under section 425.16, whether or not the claim is based on conduct in exercise of those rights.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court said that the phrase ‘arising from’ in section 425.16 should not be construed as meaning ‘in response to.’ [Citation.] ‘In short, the statutory phrase “cause of action . . . arising from” means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A cause of action may be ‘triggered by protected activity’ without necessarily arising from such protected activity. [Citation.]” (Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl Street, LLC, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1317-1318.)

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