Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Citation
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946) 1.
- Parent Document
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1946-05-27
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2616982/berry-v-chaplin/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (106)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652 (1946)
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
- Section 1833
Full Text
2,302 chars1. Did the court err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the action? The stipulation to which reference has been made contains the following, among other provisions: That subsequent to the making of said claim by Joan Berry defendant voluntarily agreed to pay to her the sums of money set forth in the stipulation for medical care and for her support and for all hospital and medical expenses necessary for her proper care during the period of her pregnancy and confinement and attendant upon the birth of the child, upon condition that she would voluntarily submit said child after its birth to medical tests for the purpose of determining its paternity and that she would make herself and said child available at all times so that said tests could be made by competent medical experts; that an order be made by the superior court whereby defendant shall be required to pay to the guardian ad litem the amounts set forth in the stipulation for said purposes, and that attorneys’ fees in the sum of $5,000 shall be paid directly to the attorneys for plaintiff; that if the action shall be tried defendant shall pay an additional sum of $5,000 as attorneys’ feés; that the action shall not be brought to trial until at least four months after the birth of the child and not until appropriate tests shall have been conducted as provided in the stipulation; that after said child shall have lived for a period of not less than four months it shall be made available for the purpose of having such tests made; that one physician shall be named by defendant, one by the guardian ad litem, and the two physicians so chosen shall select a third “who shall be especially skilled in such matters, who shall make a blood test or other tests accepted by medical science for the purpose of proving and establishing paternity, and who shall report their findings and conclusions with respect to the paternity of said child to the said guardian ad litem and to the defendant”; that said Joan Berry shall be bound by said stipulation as if she were the plaintiff and real party in interest; that defendant, by entering into the stipulation, shall in *656no way be deemed or construed as thereby admitting any allegation in the complaint, but on the contrary denies that he is or could be the father of the child.