Following the commencement of the action a stipulation . was signed by the guardian ad litem and the attorneys then representing her and plaintiff, and by defendant and his attorneys, which recites the claim of Joan Berry, the mother of the *654prospective child, that she was then with child begotten by defendant on or about December 20, 1942, and the denial of defendant that he was the father of said child. The stipulation, the details of which will be stated hereinafter, provides for the making of tests of the blood of the child, of Joan Berry, and of defendant. Said stipulation was approved by the Honorable William S. Baird, a judge of the superior court. After the birth of the child blood tests were made by physicians, chosen as provided in the stipulation. They unanimously reported their conclusion from the tests that defendant was not the father of the child. Counsel who at that time represented plaintiff did not, as provided in the stipulation, file a dismissal of the action upon the receipt of said report. Thereupon defendant made a motion for dismissal based upon the terms of the stipulation and the physicians’ report. Counsel who now represent plaintiff were substituted for the attorneys who commenced the action and who entered into said stipulation, and the present guardian ad litem was substituted for the grandmother. The motion to dismiss was heard by the Honorable Stanley Mosk, a judge of the superior court. No evidence was offered at the hearing of the motion concerning the justness or fairness of the stipulation to the minor. Judge Mosk denied the motion on March 8, 1944. Defendant then answered denying the allegations of the complaint and setting up as an affirmative defense the stipulation to which reference has been made, the report of the physicians, the payment of the sums which he agreed in the stipulation to pay, and alleging that by reason of the stipulation, the physicians’ report, and the payment of said sums, plaintiff was estopped to proceed with the action. The case came on for trial before the Honorable Clarence L. Kincaid, whereupon, on motion of defendant, his special defense was considered and ruled upon before the case proceeded to trial. Again no evidence was presented as to whether the stipulation was for the best interests of the minor. The court ruled that “the first affirmative defense herein which is a plea in bar to the further prosecution of the action is denied. ’ ’