11
Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 845, fn. 6) and, in this regard, it is the burden of the
appealing party to support factual assertions with citation to the record (Cal. Rules of Court,
8.883(a)(1)(B); American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 258, 284).
Third, the record does not demonstrate the parties modified the original agreement. By
remaining on the property after the expiration of the 60-day notice, defendant became a
holdover tenant. (Aviel v. Ng (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 809, 820.) The new tenancy is presumed
to continue under the same essential terms12 as the former agreement unless a new agreement is
reached. (Smyth v. Berman, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 192; The City v. Hart (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 92, 94-95 [Civil Code section 1945 “states the widely held rule that a landlord who
consents to his tenant’s holding over after the expiration of the lease without making a new
agreement is bound by the terms of the original lease”]; (Miller v. Stults (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d
592, 598 [unless there is a modification to the lease, the presumption that it continued on the
same terms after expiration governs].)
The presumption that the terms of the lease agreement never changed was reinforced by
plaintiff’s own complaint. Plaintiff used Judicial Council form UD-100 to draft his complaint.
On the form, he alleged, in sections 6(a) and 6(b) that, in February 2007, the parties entered
into an oral agreement requiring defendant to pay $1,000 to plaintiff on a month-to month
basis. Next to a check box for section 6(d) is the corresponding preprinted language “The
agreement was later changed as follows (specify):” followed by a space in which to describe the
modification. Plaintiff did not check box 6(d) nor did he include any language regarding a
change to the agreement. We reject plaintiff’s claim that a new rent-free lease was the
agreement he alleged was breached.