10
display it in a conspicuous place. His failure to do so was a complete defense under LARSO.10
(See LAMC § 151.09(E) & (F).)
Plaintiff offers an alternative argument. This approach accepts that the original lease
was void due to the absence of a registration statement but argues the lease that the complaint
alleges defendant breached is not the original oral agreement but rather a subsequently
modified lease which did not demand rent. Plaintiff points out he served defendant with a 60-
day notice to quit on May 1 and, after the period expired, plaintiff allowed defendant to remain
in the residence without paying rent for approximately three months until commencement of
the UD proceedings. He claims, by permitting defendant to live rent-free for that period of
time, the parties effectively modified the original terms of the lease to create a new and valid
rent-free agreement. Thus, viewed through this lens, he did not violate LAMC § 151.05(A)
because (1) his UD action did not allege the breach of a lease that required the payment of rent,
and (2) he did not accept rent after the lease was amended.11
There are three problems with plaintiff’s argument. First, it is forfeited because plaintiff
did not argue in the trial court that the lease was revised. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47
Cal.4th 598, 603; Vallejo Police Officers Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 601,
621.) Second, defendant points to nothing in the record to support his position that rent was not
demanded during the period of time he specifies. A reviewing court may not consider
assertions of fact in a party’s brief that are not supported by the record (Myers v. Philip Morris