Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 4th 607 (2015)

6
       We note as well that these decisions did not involve a motion to quash. Liebovich
was an appeal from the judgment in favor of the landlord, and Lacrabere was an appeal
from the denial of the lessees’ motion for a nonsuit. (Liebovich, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at
p. 512; Lacrabere, supra, 141 Cal. at p. 555; see also Palm Property, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 1421 [appeal from judgment in favor of lessors].)
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the complaint, and, if controverted, prove[n] [at] trial” does not transform the
requirement into a jurisdictional prerequisite. (Lacrabere, supra, 141 Cal. at p.
556.)
        For similar reasons, petitioner’s reliance on three statutory provisions is
unavailing. Petitioner observes that under section 1162, which sets forth the
requirements for serving the three-day notice, the manner of serving the three-day
notice is similar to service of a summons. Petitioner also relies on section 1166,
subdivision (a)(5), which states in pertinent part that the unlawful detainer
complaint must “[s]tate specifically the method used to serve the defendant with”
the three-day notice. (§ 1166, subd. (a)(5).) Finally, petitioner refers to section
415.45, subdivision (a)(1), which permits posting of an unlawful detainer summons
if the landlord provides an affidavit establishing that the party cannot be served and
that “[a] cause of action exists against the party . . . .” (§ 415.45, subd. (a)(1); see
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Ham (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 330, 333 [permitting service by posting under section 415.45 where,
“in the particular circumstances presented, the landlord . . . exercised reasonable
diligence in attempting to serve appellant.”].) Petitioner contends that this
provision establishes that an unlawful detainer action may not be started unless the
plaintiff demonstrates that a cause of action exists.
        These provisions, considered alone or in combination, do not suggest that
service of the three day notice confers personal jurisdiction or that a motion to
quash service of the summons is the proper vehicle to raise a factual challenge to
the service of the three-day notice. There is no dispute that the three-day notice is,
as petitioner asserts, “foundational.” Nor is there any dispute that the landlord
must establish service of the three-day notice in order to obtain a judgment for