Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 4th 607 (2015)

Citation
Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 4th 607 (2015)
Parent Document
Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 4th 607 (2015)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2015-11-23

Other Sections in This Document (25)

Full Text

2,109 chars
5
[“Delta’s broad language has created confusion and uncertainty among some
practitioners.”] (Eviction Defense Manual); id. § 13.3 [noting that although section
430.10, subd. (e) “includes the failure of a complaint to sufficiently state the cause
of action as a ground for demurrer,” Delta holds that “such a defect must be
attacked by a motion to quash rather than a demurrer . . . .”]; Cal. Landlord-Tenant
Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2015) § 10.20 [stating that Delta’s “language is
confusing”] (Landlord-Tenant Practice).) We find Delta’s language more than
merely confusing. Its broad declaration that a motion to quash is the proper way to
contest whether an unlawful detainer complaint states a cause of action, and to
challenge service of a notice to pay or quit, is not supportable.
       First, Delta apparently assumed, without expressly stating, that the court
obtains personal jurisdiction over the tenant through the landlord’s service of a
three-day notice to pay or quit. That is incorrect. Personal jurisdiction is conferred
by service on the tenant of the unlawful detainer summons and complaint. (See
Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 443 [“‘[S]ervice of
summons is not effective and the court does not acquire jurisdiction of the party
unless the statutory requirements for service of summons are met.’ [Citations.]”];
Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2015) ¶ 3:130 [the court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant “by
service of process in accordance with statutory and due process requirements”].)
       As compared to service of summons, by which the court acquires personal
jurisdiction, service of the three-day notice is merely an element of an unlawful
detainer cause of action that must be alleged and proven for the landlord to acquire
possession. (§ 1161, subd. 2; see also Lacrabere v. Wise (1904) 141 Cal. 554, 556
[“It is . . . essential to allege the service of [the three-day notice] in the complaint,
and, if controverted, prove it on the trial.”] (Lacrabere); Palm Property, supra, 194