6
unacceptable standard to incorporate in statutory requirements or
prohibitions. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 1942.5, subd. (d) [“[I]t is unlawful for a
lessor to increase rent . . . for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee
because the lessee . . . has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under
the law.”]; id., subd. (g) [“a lessor may recover possession of a dwelling and do
any of the other acts described . . . within subdivision (d), if the notice of . . .
rent increase . . . states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks
to . . . increase rent . . . . If the statement is controverted, the lessor shall
establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.”]; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971)
20 Cal.App.3d 278, 280–281 [plaintiff stated claim for retaliatory eviction
where landlord increased rent to an amount that was “unfair, unreasonable
and uneconomical” because it was an almost 100 percent increase to an
amount that was twice the market value].)
Mak v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
60, is persuasive. In that case, this court upheld a regulation promulgated by
the local rent board that created a rebuttable presumption that a tenancy
which is terminated voluntarily but within one-year of service of notice of
owner move-in “ ‘is presumed to have been terminated by the owner as a
result of the notice’ ” and provided that “ ‘[t]he rental rate for the next
tenancy established in the vacated unit shall be no more than the maximum
allowed under the Rent Ordinance for the tenant who vacated, plus any
subsequent increases authorized by the Rent Board.’ ” (Mak, supra, at p. 65.)
The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the rent restriction was
preempted by the “vacancy decontrol” provisions of Costa Hawkins which
protect the landlord’s right to “establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling
or unit.” (§ 1954.53, subd. (a); Mak, supra, at pp. 68–69.) The court explained
that the regulation “ ‘create[s] an administrative deterrent to discourage