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defense or an element of a lessor’s prima facie case. Consequently, we must resort to other
tools to interpret the intent of the Legislature. (Center for Local Government Accountability v.
City of San Diego, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.) “‘To understand the intended meaning
of a statutory phrase, we may consider use of the same or similar language in other statutes,
because similar words or phrases in statutes in pari materia ordinarily will be given the same
interpretation.’” (Wendz v. State Dept. of Education (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 633.) Statutes
are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same subject, the same class of
persons or things, or they have the same purpose or object. (Ibid.)
Section 1942.4 (a habitability statute) provides that “[a] landlord of a dwelling may not
demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay
rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if” the
premises is uninhabitable prior to the lessor’s demand or notice. (§ 1942.4, subd. (a).) Section
1942.5 (an anti-retaliation statute) provides, “[i]f the lessor retaliates against the lessee because
of the exercise by the lessee of the lessee’s rights under this chapter or because of the lessee’s
complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, . . . the lessor may not
recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding . . . within 180 days of [certain
specified events].” (§ 1942.5, subd. (a).) Both statutes, which prevent lessors from recovering
possession due to statutory violations but without specifying who bears the burden of proof, are
deemed affirmative defenses. (Boyd v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 7, and cases
cited.)
Considering that the provision in section 1962—“[a] successor owner or manager shall
not serve a notice pursuant to paragraph (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent”— is roughly similar to the language used in
sections 1942.4 and 1942.5, relate to the same subject and class of persons or things (landlord-
tenant relationships), and have the same purpose or object (protecting tenants), we presume the
Legislature intended section 1962 to be an affirmative defense. (See Wendz v. State Dept. of
Education, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 627.) Accordingly, we hold that compliance with
section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which defendant bore the burden of proof. To the