Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281 (2014)

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Thus, if Sierra's failure to repair the premises constitutes a tort grounded on negligence,
appellant is entitled to prove his damages for emotional distress because the failure to
repair must be deemed to constitute an injury to his tenancy interest (right to habitable
premises), which is a species of property. (Id. at p. 923.)
       Moreover, we observe that Evidence Code section 669 "codifies the common law
doctrine of negligence per se, pursuant to which statutes and regulations may be used to
establish duties and standards of care in negligence actions." (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34
Cal.4th 915, 927, fn. omitted.) "Statutes may be borrowed in the negligence context for
one of two purposes: (1) to establish a duty of care, or (2) to establish a standard of care.
[Citations.]" (Id. at p. 928, fn. 8; see Toole v. Richardson–Merrell Inc. (1967) 251
Cal.App.2d 689, 702–704, [rebuttable presumption of negligence arose from violation of
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].)
       Here, the complaint contains causes of action for breach of the warranty of
habitability in various forms—1) "Violation of California Civil Code Section 1942.4"; 2)
"Tortious Violation for Breach of the Warranty of Habitability"; 3) "Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress"; 4) "Negligent Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress"; 5)
"Negligence: Violation of Duty to Maintain Habitable Conditions." Based on the
foregoing, we cannot say as a matter of law that these causes of action are not viable.
       As to appellant's remaining causes of action for constructive eviction, breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and retaliatory eviction, we note that every lease
includes a covenant of quiet possession and enjoyment. (Civ.Code, § 1927.) This
covenant is breached upon actual or constructive eviction of the tenant. (McAlester v.
Landers (1886) 70 Cal. 79, 82.) Any interference by the landlord that deprives the tenant
of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises or renders the premises unfit for the purposes
for which they are let amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and
vacates within a reasonable time. (Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware Paper Co. (1944) 25
Cal.2d 664, 670; Pierce v. Nash (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 606, 612-613.)