Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281 (2014)

Citation: Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281 (2014)
Parent Document: Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281 (2014)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2014-06-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2677838/erlach-v-sierra-asset-servicing-llc/ ↗

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appellant requested that Sierra restore the property as promised. On December 3, 2010,
Sierra told appellant that the property was ready for him. However, the property was not
restored. Some of appellant's belongings were missing and the kitchen and bathroom had
not been restored; piles of construction garbage were left throughout the property. The
flooring and wall coverings were missing. On December 27, 2010, the property had still
not been restored; the red-tag was still on the property and so appellant moved out.
Appellant filed a complaint for unspecified damages alleging eight causes of
action against Schwann and Sierra:3 1) "Violation of California Civil Code Section
1942.4"; 2) "Tortious Violation for Breach of the Warranty of Habitability"; 3)
"Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress"; 4) "Negligent Infliction of
Extreme Emotional Distress"; 5) "Negligence: Violation of Duty to Maintain Habitable
Conditions"; 6) "Constructive Eviction"; 7) "Breach of the Covenant of Quiet
Enjoyment"; 8) "Retaliatory Eviction."
Sierra demurred to every cause of action in the complaint on the ground that Sierra
"had no lease with" appellant and that "there was no obligation at law that compelled
SIERRA to take any action regarding SCHWANN's former tenant . . . . Further, even if
the subject lease between SCHWANN and [appellant] were somehow valid, the
red-tagging by the County terminated the lease, immediately relieving the parties thereto,
and any party in purported privity therewith, of all obligations under that lease, as
performance of the contract terms were [sic] excused, because of impossibility due to an
action not taken by one of the parties (County of Monterey). Per Civil Code § 1933,
when the premises underwent construction for the County to lift the red tag, the property,
as it was originally contracted for, was 'destroyed,' which terminated the 'hiring' or
agreement. Lastly, any new agreement between [appellant] and SIERRA, whereby
SIERRA would assume any debt to [appellant] or default by SCHWANN described in 3
Schwann is not a party to this appeal.

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