Accepting the facts alleged as true and according plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), there is no reasonable view of the subject statements that would support a conclusion that Devine accused Better of engaging in a self-help eviction, as contemplated by the statutes cited by plaintiffs. As Supreme Court found, Devine's in-court statements plainly concerned Better's alleged use of credits owed to the Giffords before their competing claims regarding the condition of the property had been resolved. Devine's statements, in a small claims action to recover those same funds, was pertinent and thus absolutely privileged, and Supreme Court therefore properly dismissed plaintiffs' slander cause of action for failure to state a claim (see Bodner v Floral Assoc. L.P., 225 AD3d 564, 565 [1st Dept 2024]; Fabrizio v Spencer, 248 AD2d 351, 351-352 [2d Dept 1998]; R.W.P. Group v Holzberg, 202 AD2d 410, 410-411 [2d Dept 1994]; Poley v Rochester Community Sav. Bank, 159 AD2d 944, 944 [4th Dept 1990]). Similarly, Devine's statements cannot be construed as intending to deceive the court as to the happening of any such eviction, and plaintiffs' cause of action under Judiciary Law § 487 was therefore also properly dismissed (see generally Urias v Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC, 41 NY3d 560, 567-568, 570 [2024]).