As plaintiffs assert, slander per se excuses the requirement of special damages otherwise required for a defamation claim and includes both those statements that charge a plaintiff with a "serious crime" and those that "tend to injure" a plaintiff in their trade, business or profession (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 435 [1992]; see Higgins v Goyer, 162 AD3d 1191, 1193 [3d Dept 2018]; Martin v Hayes, 105 AD3d 1291, 1292 [3d Dept 2013]; see generally Geraci v Probst, 15 NY3d 336, 344 [2010]). However, it is well established that "a statement, made in open court in the course of a judicial proceeding, is absolutely privileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, it may be considered pertinent to the litigation" (Martirano v Frost, [*2]25 NY2d 505, 507 [1969]; see Park Knoll Assoc. v Schmidt, 59 NY2d 205, 209 [1983]). Said another way, an in-court statement may not be the subject of an action for any sort of defamation unless the statement is "so outrageously out of context as to permit one to conclude, from the mere fact that the statement was uttered, that it was motivated by no other desire than to defame" (Martirano v Frost, 25 NY2d at 508). Pertinency, examined under this "extremely liberal" test, presents a legal question amenable to determination on a motion to dismiss (Grasso v Mathew, 164 AD2d 476, 479 [3d Dept 1991], lv dismissed 77 NY2d 940 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 855 [1991]; see Davidoff v Kaplan, 217 AD3d 918, 920 [2d Dept 2023]; Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. v Margrabe, 38 AD3d 163, 173-174 [1st Dept 2007], abrogated on other grounds by Front, Inc. v Khalil, 24 NY3d 713 [2015]).