Independent 435 CPW Tenants' Assn. v. Park Front Apts., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 01716 (2025)

Citation: Independent 435 CPW Tenants' Assn. v. Park Front Apts., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 01716 (2025)
Parent Document: Independent 435 CPW Tenants' Assn. v. Park Front Apts., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 01716 (2025)
Jurisdiction: New York (state)
Effective Date: 2025-03-20
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10360824/independent-435-cpw-tenants-as... ↗

Full Text

1,782 chars

Supreme Court erred, however, to the extent it permitted defendant to avail itself of luxury or high-rent vacancy deregulation based on records concerning the Interim Period (see Matter of AEJ 534 E. 88th, LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 194 AD3d 464, 470-471 [1st Dept 2021]). First, the import of DHCR's 1999 opinion letter was that the building was subject to rent regulation in the absence or at the expiration of federal preemption, and under our previous decision defendant cannot now dispute that "the building was subject to the Rent Stabilization Law as of April 12, 2011" (435 Cent. Park W. Tenant Assn., 164 AD3d at 414). Whether RSC 2526.1 (a) (3) (iii) (as plaintiffs contend) or RSL 26-512 (b) (3) and RSC 2521.1 (j) (as defendant contends) apply, all contemplate the initial or first post-exemption tenancy as one subject to rent stabilization (see RSL 26-512 [b] [3] ["The initial regulated rent . . ."]; RSC 2521.1 [j] ["the initial legal regulated rent shall be . . ."]; RSC 2526.1 [a] [3] [iii] ["the legal regulated rent . . ."] [emphasis added]; see also Gordon v 305 Riverside Corp., 93 AD3d 590, 592 [1st Dept 2012]). It is undisputed that no tenants during the Interim Period were provided with rent stabilized leases. In any event, luxury deregulation "was never automatic, even before the HSTPA" (AEJ 534 E. 88th, LLC,194 AD3d at 471; see Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, — NY3d &mdash, 2024 NY Slip Op 06377, *11 [2024] ["pre-HSTPA, the RSL did not require immediate deregulation upon the statutory conditions for luxury deregulation being met"]), and the record reflects that no party, including defendant, conceived of the building as being luxury deregulated at that time.

Other Sections in This Document (32)

Full Text