In opposition, plaintiff argues that Khalid’s decision to replace the USTs was a business rather than a maintenance decision because Khalid did not have actual knowledge of any contamination prior to excavating the USTs.1 However, the lease clearly authorized Khalid to evaluate potential—as well as actual— environmental problems. Thus, a business decision to replace the USTs, even if as a precautionary or preventative measure, can reasonably be categorized as maintenance or repair under the terms of the lease. The interpretation of these lease terms poses only legal issues, within the court’s province (see Currier, McCabe & Assoc., Inc. v Maher, 75 AD3d 889, 890 [2010]; see also Fucile v L.C.R. Dev., Ltd., 102 AD3d 915, 919 [2013]; 112 W. 34th St. Assoc., LLC v 112-1400 Trade Props. LLC, 95 AD3d 529, 531 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 854 [2012]). Upon review, we find that the lease allowed Khalid to enter the premises and replace the USTs, and that plaintiff failed to raise factual issues in this regard.2 Accordingly, summary judgment dismissing the causes of action for constructive eviction, trespass and treble damages against Khalid is warranted. In addition, although VSH did not appeal, this Court has the authority to grant summary judgment to a nonappealing party (see Shields v Carbone, 78 AD3d 1440, 1443 n 2 [2010]) and, on this record, we find summary judgment dismissing those causes of action against VSH to be warranted as well.