Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 11
24-CV-04273 Juliet Stephens v. Shannon Gilmour
Defendant filed an answer and counterclaims on behalf of herself and her daughter. The
counterclaims for both Defendant and M.G. included the following:
1) Breach of the implied warranty of habitability for lack of smoke detectors and carbon
monoxide detectors.
2) Breach of the warranty of habitability regarding mold and smells from the upstairs
bathroom.
3) Retaliatory Eviction under 9 V.S.A. § 4465 based on the following alleged facts:
a. Plaintiff’s failure on 9/9/24 to give Defendant a 60-day notice of rent increase;
b. Defendant’s request for smoke and carbon monoxide detectors on 9/10/24;
c. Plaintiff’s threatening statements on 9/10/24;
d. Defendant’s contacting Vermont Tenants, Inc. on 9/14/24;
e. Defendant’s complaint to a government regulatory entity on 9/14/24; and
f. Plaintiff’s changing of the terms of the verbal agreement between the parties to
extend the written lease.
These claims, in respect to Defendant, have survived the various motions to dismiss, and remain
active counterclaims against Plaintiff’s ejectment claim.
In addition to the surviving counterclaims, Defendant brought the following counterclaims that
have been dismissed by the Court in previous rulings:
4) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) based on:
a. Plaintiff’s initial failure to install smoke and carbon monoxide detectors and failure
to install them when asked; and
b. Plaintiff’s attorney’s initial statements, actions, and filings against Defendant, and
Plaintiff and her attorney’s decision to include Defendant’s minor child, M.G. in the
complaint as a separate party.
5) Defamation based on Plaintiff’s inclusion of M.G. as a separate party in the complaint for
ejectment.
6) Abuse of process based on Plaintiff’s inclusion of M.G. as a separate party in the complaint
for ejectment.
On January 8, 2025, the Court issued an Order on the parties’ pending motions. In that
Order, the Court ruled as follows. First, it gave Defendant 30 days to obtain counsel for M.G.
pursuant to Estate of Snelgrove v. LeBlanc, 2023 VT 58, ¶¶ 6–7, 218 Vt. 636. Second, it denied
Defendant’s motion to join Attorneys Safar and Stafford to the present matter pursuant to V.R.C.P.
19. Third, it ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why M.G. should not be dismissed as a party.
Fourth, it dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. The Court found that the facts plead for both IIED claims did not rise as a matter of
law to the type of outrageous and extreme actions on which such a claim must be premised. The
Court dismissed the defamation claim as it belonged to M.G. and not to Defendant. Both dismissals
were pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Fifth, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the