Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546 (1992)

Citation: Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546 (1992)
Parent Document: Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546 (1992)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1992-01-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9003635/hussion-v-madigan/ ↗

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The imaginative interpretation of the enabling statute’s requirements urged by the appellees — which finds in the statute the requirements of a guarantee of discovery rights and a separate administrative appeal process, for example — arguably projects a picture of how a more wisely crafted statute might well have looked. Nevertheless, this expanded interpretation does not provide this court, as we assume the deferential posture mandated by Chevron, with the authority to reject an administrative action clearly supported by a permissible reading of the statute. Moreover, the legislative history that is explored extensively in appellees’ brief is equally unavailing on this question. “Absent a clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the statutory language controls its construction.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 n. 3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (per curiam). Here, none of the traditional tools of statutory construction indicate that the statute means anything other than what it simply says.7 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., — U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 2677, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990). Especially because “the regulations promulgated by the governmental body responsible for interpreting or administering a statute are entitled to considerable respect,” we see no reason to venture into legislative sources extrinsic to a clearly worded statute as a basis for judicial rever-

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