Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)

Citation: Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
Parent Document: Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1972-02-23
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108466/lindsey-v-normet/ ↗

Full Text

1,373 chars

The statute potentially applies to all tenants, rich and poor, commercial and noncommercial; it cannot be faulted for over-exclusiveness or under-exclusiveness. And classifying tenants of real property differently from other tenants for purposes of possessory actions will offend the equal protection safeguard “only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective,” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961), or if the objective itself is beyond the State’s power to achieve, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). It is readily apparent that prompt as well as peaceful resolution of disputes over the right to possession of real property is the end sought by the Oregon statute.18 It is also clear that the provisions for early trial and simplification of issues are closely related to that purpose. The equal protection claim with respect to these pro*71visions thus depends on whether the State may validly single out possessory disputes between landlord and tenant for especially prompt judicial settlement. In making such an inquiry a State -is “presumed to have acted within [its] constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, [its] laws result in some inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 425-426.

Other Sections in This Document (263)

Full Text