§ 151
- Citation
- § 151
- Parent Document
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (2009)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2009-10-09
Other Sections in This Document (181)
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (2009)
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (2009)
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (2009)
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 MORTON LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (2009)
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Full Text
835 chars. The district court's judgment assumes that Morton intended to terminate the tenancies for the sole purpose of raising the rent. In its motion for reconsideration, Morton argued that it was also motivated by the desire to rid itself of various section 8 compliance costs. The district court rejected this late assertion, finding that Morton put forth no evidence of compliance costs, but that in any case, a bare desire to leave the section 8 program does not constitute "good cause.” On appeal, Morton does not dispute that both sets of Notices were solely motivated by its desire to raise the rent. Nor does Morton address the district court’s finding that a bare desire to withdraw from the program cannot constitute “good cause.” Therefore, we also assume that Morton’s only reason for eviction was the desire to raise the rent. 5